Yep, prototype #3.
Famous for this:
Always was a big fan of the 747 too. But I can imagine that it's just so big, and heavy it's not exactly nimble. Did you ever fly a 757? I hear that's quite a hot-rod for an airliner.
Yep, prototype #3.
Famous for this:
Always was a big fan of the 747 too. But I can imagine that it's just so big, and heavy it's not exactly nimble. Did you ever fly a 757? I hear that's quite a hot-rod for an airliner.
Yep, prototype #3.
Famous for this:
Always was a big fan of the 747 too. But I can imagine that it's just so big, and heavy it's not exactly nimble. Did you ever fly a 757? I hear that's quite a hot-rod for an airliner.
Size does not always matter with everything. The B-777 is a big airplane but it flies with ease. Basically, fingertip control. I was lucky in my career and got to fly every Boeing after the B-707. Again, the B-777 is my favorite. Yes, I did fly the B-757. It is a very sleek, clean flying aircraft. When you pulled the power off at altitude for descent into an airport, you had to stay ahead of it. It just wanted to keep flying. It's a beautiful looking aircraft. Probably why Trump owns one. The 757 was a narrow body and mostly flew domestic. I liked to fly wide body aircraft internationally. I enjoyed flying NY to Hong Kong. It was a 16 hour flight and we had to have two crews on board for rest regulations. There are bunks onboard for sleeping. I flew this route for time off. I only had to fly three round trips a month.
Yes, the F-14 could fly with a wing retracted in case of battle damage or a failure. That's probably the test flight. It's not a desired configuration but it can be done. The fuselage actually produced 50% of the lift. Look how small the wings are when extended.
Size does not always matter with everything. The B-777 is a big airplane but it flies with ease. Basically, fingertip control. I was lucky in my career and got to fly every Boeing after the B-707. Again, the B-777 is my favorite. Yes, I did fly the B-757. It is a very sleek, clean flying aircraft. When you pulled the power off at altitude for descent into an airport, you had to stay ahead of it. It just wanted to keep flying. It's a beautiful looking aircraft. Probably why Trump owns one. The 757 was a narrow body and mostly flew domestic. I liked to fly wide body aircraft internationally. I enjoyed flying NY to Hong Kong. It was a 16 hour flight and we had to have two crews on board for rest regulations. There are bunks onboard for sleeping. I flew this route for time off. I only had to fly three round trips a month.
Yes, the F-14 could fly with a wing retracted in case of battle damage or a failure. That's probably the test flight. It's not a desired configuration but it can be done. The fuselage actually produced 50% of the lift. Look how small the wings are when extended.
Yes, that's the one where they tested wing asymmetry. Supposedly the test pilot wanted to try to bring it on the boat that way, but they believed they had already made the point.
I suspect the heavy nature of the 74' may have to do with it being an older design and still having cables. Although there's a lot to be said for redundancy. If the 777 is fly by wire they can program any kind of response into it that they want.
As far as looks; I realize it's the evolution of design and function, but everything evolving into a twin leaves them all looking generic. I miss the tri-jets, T tails, quad-jets, clamshell thrust reversers and all the other character traits where you could identify them from a distance.
Yes, that's the one where they tested wing asymmetry. Supposedly the test pilot wanted to try to bring it on the boat that way, but they believed they had already made the point.
I suspect the heavy nature of the 74' may have to do with it being an older design and still having cables. Although there's a lot to be said for redundancy. If the 777 is fly by wire they can program any kind of response into it that they want.
As far as looks; I realize it's the evolution of design and function, but everything evolving into a twin leaves them all looking generic. I miss the tri-jets, T tails, quad-jets, clamshell thrust reversers and all the other character traits where you could identify them from a distance.
Like cars, they all look the same now.
"clamshell thrust reversers"
Avenger, we are hijacking this thread. One last thing and yes, it's long winded.
You seem to be a real airplane buff. Speaking of thrust reversers, did you ever see a B-727 back out of the gate using just the thrust reversers? It was pretty cool. You just had to be careful not to hit the brakes while backing up, it could stand the aircraft on it's tail if you did. They only did it on the B-727 due to the high, tail mounted engines. I don't think the DC-9 ever did powerbacks. You were not allowed to do it on any pod mounted, wing engine like the B-737. The engines were too low to the ground and you could ingest crap from the ground. Which brings me to another of my long winded stories in which using the thrust reversers to back out of a gate killed a plane load of passengers and crew.
Do you remember Air Florida Flight 90. It was the B-737 that crashed into the Potomac River after hitting lthe 14th Street bridge in Washington, DC in January 1982. The flight attendants were my crew the night before when we flew into LGA for an overnight. They were scheduled to fly out the next day with a different crew from LGA to DCA to FLL. There was a really bad snow storm going on in DCA when they arrived. At that time, the Air Florida's aircraft were serviced by American Airlines in DCA and this day was no different.
A little history of aircraft accidents. Aircraft accidents, for the most part, don't just happen. There is usually a series of mistakes before an accident. It's called the Error Chain. The error chain is usually a pilot induced series of mistakes that lead to an accident. If a pilot realizes he made a mistake, he could break the error chain by going back to standard operating procedures or SOP's. The Air Florida accident was a crash that should not have happened. We study and discuss that accident in our annual recurrent training almost every year because it was so classic of what not to do. That crash actually changed the way we fly today.
In the old days, the Captain was God. You didn't question him. You did what he said. Because of the Captain Bligh effect, co-pilots, now known as First Officers, were hesitant to point out mistakes the Captain might have been making. It's different today, we fly by a set of guidelines called the SOP's. Following the SOP's is manditory. It allows us to fly with anyone in our company from any base because he will do what is expected. It's a set of procedures that we as pilots expect you as the other pilot to follow. Deviations for emergencies, are disscussed before an action is taken. For the most part, nothing is needed to be done immediately. If you rush into an emergency, you could make the situation a lot worse. Nowadays, you must question the Captain if he is not flying by the SOP's. You cannot make shit up thinking it's a better way without talking it over with the other pilot. If you don't, you will confuse the other pilot. They won't know what you will do next when you are not following the SOP's. Everyone needs to be on the same page.
Back to AF 90. The Captain was a really bad pilot. Not to crap on his grave but he crashed that aircraft and killed those passengers, crew members and close friends. He did not follow the SOP's and made a series of fatal mistakes. The error chain was building as they sat in the gate.
The snow was coming down hard. Long delays for takeoff. AA was contracted to de-ice the plane at the gate. Unfortunately, they used a deicing fluid that was not mixed correctly and it was weak. AA also provided the tug to push the aircraft back at departure time. The tug could not get traction due to the icing on the ramp. Mistakes began to happen. The Captain decided on his own to powerback the B-737. That is not allowed on a nice day, on this day it was an absolutely crazy thing to do. Snow and ice was ingested into the engines when the buckets were opened and the powerback began. After a few tries, it didn't work and a tug with chains was called for. With all the confusion and the engines running, the pilots missed turning on the engine anti-ice. With all the snow and ice going into the engine and the anti-ice off, it plugged up a probe on the bullet nose of the engine. It's called a PT probe. Basically, it measured the pressure at the front of the engine and another probe measured the pressure at the rear of the engine. Those measurements gave you a power setting for takeoff called EPR or engine pressure ratio. The error chain is building. Bad deicing fluid, no chains on the tug causing the tires to slip, Captain uses the thrust reversers to power the aircraft back, ice and snow ingested into the engine AND, the Captain forgot to turn on the engine anti-ice. Powering back the B-737 with thrust reversers and not having the engine anti-ice on was the most fatal mistake that day but they continued adding to the error chain.
It was snowing hard and there were long delays for takeoff. The B-737 has a flaw. Minor buildup of snow and ice causes huge performance problems. On taxi out, the Captain decided to tuck the aircraft behind a DC-9 thinking the exhaust would melt the snow that was accumulating on the wings. He was hell bent to takeoff and did not want to go back to the gate and deice again. Another huge error. The jet blast blew his de-icing fluid off the wings and ice formed.
The Captain was determined that they were going. The F/O, a very good friend of mine, was a very experienced Air Force F-15 pilot and while he spoke up, the Captain over ruled his suggestions. They took the runway and pushed up the power. The F/O was flying. Due to the powerback and the engine anti-ice being off the takeoff EPR setting was not indicating the proper thrust coming from the engines and they were way under powered for takeoff. The F/O noticed something was wrong but the Captain would not listen and told him to keep rolling. They were not accelerating. The F/O again said there was something wrong. There was plenty of time to stop the aircraft but the Captain told him to keep going. On rotation, the plane pitched up and stalled. The F/O's final words to the Captain: "Larry, we're going down, Larry". The Captain said: "I know it". Boom, they slammed into the 14th street bridge and snapped the tail off the aircraft.
Six people seated in the tail made it into the fuel covered icy water's of the Potomac alive. Everyone else in the fuselage were killed on impact with the river bed. It took a while for the emergency personel to get to the accident site. The six people were in the water holding onto the tail of the aircraft sticking out of the water. When a helicopter arrived, one survivor, called the sixth man, kept passing the rope from the helicopter to others as they held on to the icy tail. Perhaps you remember the famous scene of the Flight Attendant being dragged through the ice by the helicopter. She couldn't hold on any longer and let go of the rope. A fireman, on the river bank, jumped into the water to get her. Five people were brought to shore. The helicopter went back to get the sixth man, unfortunately, due to the cold, he could not hold on any longer and drowned.
All of this was caused by not following the SOP's and a Captain who thought he was God's gift to flying. When his history was reviewed, he failed checkrides and was known for not following checklists or standard operating procedures. After this crash, the airlines took a hard look at why this and other accidents happened. It led to what is now called CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) also called by some CLR. Basically, it was recognized that both pilots were trained to fly that airplane. A Captain Bligh was dangerous. If someone was not comfortable with a procedure the other pilot was doing, it's his responsibility to speak up and it's the responsibility of the other pilot to listen. Once discussed, the Captain made a more inform decision. Synergy, produced a better solution.
The Air Florida Flight 90 crash helped change the way U.S pilots fly and made it one of the safest modes of transportation in the world.
Crew resource management. I remember being stuck a block from my house in my 1978 Buick Regal, it was snowing really hard here in NY as well. I heard the news of the Potomac crash on the car radio.
"clamshell thrust reversers"
Avenger, we are hijacking this thread. One last thing and yes, it's long winded.
You seem to be a real airplane buff. Speaking of thrust reversers, did you ever see a B-727 back out of the gate using just the thrust reversers? It was pretty cool. You just had to be careful not to hit the brakes while backing up, it could stand the aircraft on it's tail if you did. They only did it on the B-727 due to the high, tail mounted engines. I don't think the DC-9 ever did powerbacks. You were not allowed to do it on any pod mounted, wing engine like the B-737. The engines were too low to the ground and you could ingest crap from the ground. Which brings me to another of my long winded stories in which using the thrust reversers to back out of a gate killed a plane load of passengers and crew.
Do you remember Air Florida Flight 90. It was the B-737 that crashed into the Potomac River after hitting lthe 14th Street bridge in Washington, DC in January 1982. The flight attendants were my crew the night before when we flew into LGA for an overnight. They were scheduled to fly out the next day with a different crew from LGA to DCA to FLL. There was a really bad snow storm going on in DCA when they arrived. At that time, the Air Florida's aircraft were serviced by American Airlines in DCA and this day was no different.
A little history of aircraft accidents. Aircraft accidents, for the most part, don't just happen. There is usually a series of mistakes before an accident. It's called the Error Chain. The error chain is usually a pilot induced series of mistakes that lead to an accident. If a pilot realizes he made a mistake, he could break the error chain by going back to standard operating procedures or SOP's. The Air Florida accident was a crash that should not have happened. We study and discuss that accident in our annual recurrent training almost every year because it was so classic of what not to do. That crash actually changed the way we fly today.
In the old days, the Captain was God. You didn't question him. You did what he said. Because of the Captain Bligh effect, co-pilots, now known as First Officers, were hesitant to point out mistakes the Captain might have been making. It's different today, we fly by a set of guidelines called the SOP's. Following the SOP's is manditory. It allows us to fly with anyone in our company from any base because he will do what is expected. It's a set of procedures that we as pilots expect you as the other pilot to follow. Deviations for emergencies, are disscussed before an action is taken. For the most part, nothing is needed to be done immediately. If you rush into an emergency, you could make the situation a lot worse. Nowadays, you must question the Captain if he is not flying by the SOP's. You cannot make shit up thinking it's a better way without talking it over with the other pilot. If you don't, you will confuse the other pilot. They won't know what you will do next when you are not following the SOP's. Everyone needs to be on the same page.
Back to AF 90. The Captain was a really bad pilot. Not to crap on his grave but he crashed that aircraft and killed those passengers, crew members and close friends. He did not follow the SOP's and made a series of fatal mistakes. The error chain was building as they sat in the gate.
The snow was coming down hard. Long delays for takeoff. AA was contracted to de-ice the plane at the gate. Unfortunately, they used a deicing fluid that was not mixed correctly and it was weak. AA also provided the tug to push the aircraft back at departure time. The tug could not get traction due to the icing on the ramp. Mistakes began to happen. The Captain decided on his own to powerback the B-737. That is not allowed on a nice day, on this day it was an absolutely crazy thing to do. Snow and ice was ingested into the engines when the buckets were opened and the powerback began. After a few tries, it didn't work and a tug with chains was called for. With all the confusion and the engines running, the pilots missed turning on the engine anti-ice. With all the snow and ice going into the engine and the anti-ice off, it plugged up a probe on the bullet nose of the engine. It's called a PT probe. Basically, it measured the pressure at the front of the engine and another probe measured the pressure at the rear of the engine. Those measurements gave you a power setting for takeoff called EPR or engine pressure ratio. The error chain is building. Bad deicing fluid, no chains on the tug causing the tires to slip, Captain uses the thrust reversers to power the aircraft back, ice and snow ingested into the engine AND, the Captain forgot to turn on the engine anti-ice. Powering back the B-737 with thrust reversers and not having the engine anti-ice on was the most fatal mistake that day but they continued adding to the error chain.
It was snowing hard and there were long delays for takeoff. The B-737 has a flaw. Minor buildup of snow and ice causes huge performance problems. On taxi out, the Captain decided to tuck the aircraft behind a DC-9 thinking the exhaust would melt the snow that was accumulating on the wings. He was hell bent to takeoff and did not want to go back to the gate and deice again. Another huge error. The jet blast blew his de-icing fluid off the wings and ice formed.
The Captain was determined that they were going. The F/O, a very good friend of mine, was a very experienced Air Force F-15 pilot and while he spoke up, the Captain over ruled his suggestions. They took the runway and pushed up the power. The F/O was flying. Due to the powerback and the engine anti-ice being off the takeoff EPR setting was not indicating the proper thrust coming from the engines and they were way under powered for takeoff. The F/O noticed something was wrong but the Captain would not listen and told him to keep rolling. They were not accelerating. The F/O again said there was something wrong. There was plenty of time to stop the aircraft but the Captain told him to keep going. On rotation, the plane pitched up and stalled. The F/O's final words to the Captain: "Larry, we're going down, Larry". The Captain said: "I know it". Boom, they slammed into the 14th street bridge and snapped the tail off the aircraft.
Six people seated in the tail made it into the fuel covered icy water's of the Potomac alive. Everyone else in the fuselage were killed on impact with the river bed. It took a while for the emergency personel to get to the accident site. The six people were in the water holding onto the tail of the aircraft sticking out of the water. When a helicopter arrived, one survivor, called the sixth man, kept passing the rope from the helicopter to others as they held on to the icy tail. Perhaps you remember the famous scene of the Flight Attendant being dragged through the ice by the helicopter. She couldn't hold on any longer and let go of the rope. A fireman, on the river bank, jumped into the water to get her. Five people were brought to shore. The helicopter went back to get the sixth man, unfortunately, due to the cold, he could not hold on any longer and drowned.
All of this was caused by not following the SOP's and a Captain who thought he was God's gift to flying. When his history was reviewed, he failed checkrides and was known for not following checklists or standard operating procedures. After this crash, the airlines took a hard look at why this and other accidents happened. It led to what is now called CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) also called by some CLR. Basically, it was recognized that both pilots were trained to fly that airplane. A Captain Bligh was dangerous. If someone was not comfortable with a procedure the other pilot was doing, it's his responsibility to speak up and it's the responsibility of the other pilot to listen. Once discussed, the Captain made a more inform decision. Synergy, produced a better solution.
The Air Florida Flight 90 crash helped change the way U.S pilots fly and made it one of the safest modes of transportation in the world.
Aircraft hijacking! :rolleyes: Maybe the mods can move this to an aviation thread.
I remember the Air Florida crash. I believe they named the bridge after the sixth guy.
Poor CRM was also partly to blame for the Canary Islands collision and a DC-8 running out of fuel in Portland while the captain was focused on troubleshooting a faulty landing gear light. "Fortunately" there was no fire since there was no fuel, but it still killed 10 people. It sure took a lot of blood before we finally figured out that even the best pilots can make mistakes.
I've enjoyed the conversation. One of these days I'll have to track you down and buy you a beer or two and you can tell me all about your flying experiences.
We had a Byrne Bros. Chevrolet up here on Virginia Rd, I can distinctly remember looking at the new 1967 Camaros with my dad.
The power of the Internet...you can see Virginia Rd at the bottom.
JPD,
Why so angry? Did you have one back in the day that you sold for cheap? If we only knew!
No, it's the prices in general - not that particular car.
[URL unfurl="true"]https://classiccars.com/listings/view/1902692/1970-amc-rebel-for-sale-in-cleveland-ohio-44140[/URL]
[URL unfurl="true"]https://classiccars.com/listings/view/1902692/1970-amc-rebel-for-sale-in-cleveland-ohio-44140[/URL]
Always loved AMC
Was able to zoom in on the original photo the side plate said Holiday which seems to be an Olds circa mid 50’s.
[MEDIA=youtube]OvAKYCk-Bcs[/MEDIA]
found another Holiday
I luv learning every day……also love the hard top painted two tone.
Great car and new find for me.
Sign in to reply to this thread.